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I. HIV/AIDS versus MNEs 
The disastrous AIDS epidemic, the numbers killed by which worldwide have 
overtaken those of the dead in all civil wars of the 90s, took a special turn in South 
Africa with the legal case “Hazel Tau vs. Glaxo and Boehringer”. The case translates 
the multidimensional social issues into the following quaestiones juris: has the pricing 
policy  of  multinational  pharmaceutical  enterprises  violated  fundamental  human 
rights?  Can  AIDS  patients  assert  their  fundamental  right  to  life  directly  against 
multinational pharmaceutical enterprises? Does “Access to Medication as a Human 
Right” exist in the private sector? More generally: do fundamental rights obligate not 
only States, but also private transnational actors directly? 
 
39 pharmaceutical firms, represented by the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' 
Association  of  South  Africa  (PMASA),  invoked  South  Africa’s  national  courts.  In 
October  2003  the  national  Competition  Commission  had  to  decide  whether  the 
complainants had an actionable right to access to HIV medications against the firms 
GlaxoSmithKline and Boehringer Ingelheim. From the technical legal viewpoint, they 
based their legal position on the point that the pharmaceutical firms had breached 
Art.  8(a)  of  the  Competition  Act  89  of  1998  by  charging  excessive  prices  for 
antiretrovirals, to the detriment of consumers. They accused private collective actors 
of  violating  fundamental  human  rights:  “The  excessive  pricing  of  ARVs  is  directly 
responsible  for  premature,  predictable  and  avoidable  deaths  of  people  living  with 
HIV/AIDS, including both children and adults.” The surprising outcome was that the 
South African Competition Commission basically found for the complainants, even 
though it did allow the firms amortization of development costs.  
 
The “horizontal” effect of fundamental rights, i.e. the question whether they 
impose  obligations  not  only  on  governmental  bodies  but  also  directly  on  private 
actors, is taking on much more dramatic dimensions in the transnational sphere than 
it  ever  had  nationally.  It  not  only  arises  for  human-rights  infringements  by 
pharmaceutical enterprises in the worldwide AIDS epidemic, but has already raised a 
stir in several scandals in which multinational enterprises were involved. I shall single 
out  a  few  glaring  cases:  environmental  pollution  and  inhuman  treatment  of  local 
population  groups,  e.g.  by  Shell  in  Nigeria;  the  chemical  accident  in  Bhopal; 
disgraceful working conditions in ‘sweatshops’ in Asia and Latin America; child labour 
at  IKEA  and  NIKE;  accusations  that  multinational  enterprises  in  Myanmar  were 
collaborating  with  a  dictatorial  regime;  the  suspicions  levied  against  sports  goods 
manufacturer Adidas of having footballs produced in China by forced labour; the use 
of highly poisonous pesticides in banana plantations; disappearances of unionized 
workers; environmental damage from big construction projects. The list could easily 
be extended. The scandalous events fill volumes. At the core is the accusation that 
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multinational  enterprises  as  "preeminent  agents  of  environmental  degradation"  do 
lasting, irrecoverable damage to the environment and to people. 
 
In  the  transnational  sphere  it  is  extremely  hard  to  fall  back  on  patterns  of 
solution  familiar  from  national  constitutional  law.  While  these  have  dealt  with  the 
horizontal  effect  of  fundamental  rights,  they  usually  dodge  the  ticklish  point  of 
whether  private  actors  are  subject  to  direct  fundamental-rights  obligations  by 
developing a host of doctrines whereby fundamental rights develop only “indirect” 
effects in the private sector. Simplifying grossly, there are two constructions to be 
found in numerous variants in the various national constitutional legal systems. On 
the “State action” doctrine, private actors are in principle excluded from the binding 
effect of fundamental rights, unless some element of State action can be identified in 
their actions, whether because State bodies are involved or because they themselves 
perform  public  functions.  On  the  doctrine  of  the  “structural  effect  of  fundamental 
rights” those rights impact on the whole legal system including private law enacted by 
the State, so that fundamental rights must be observed in the private sector, but the 
restriction  to  the  legal  system  simultaneously  implies  that  the  private  actors 
themselves are not subject to any obligation under fundamental rights.  
 
In the transnational private sector the question whether collective actors are 
themselves  bound  by  fundamental  rights  arises  much  more  acutely.  Here  the 
otherwise omnipresent State action and national law are almost absent, so that State 
action and structural legal effect of fundamental rights apply in only a few situations. 
On the other hand, transnational private actors, especially multinational enterprises, 
regulate whole areas of life through private governance regimes of their own, so that 
the question of fundamental rights in private transnational systems can no longer be 
evaded. 
 
This faces legal policy and constitutional legal theory with enormous problems. 
Yet it would be simplistic to politcize the question directly, to reduce it to the political 
bifurcation  between  neo-liberal  and  social-democratic  conceptions  of  fundamental 
rights, hegemonic or anti-hegemonic strategies or Empire vs. Multitude. That would 
be tantamount to a political decision between either exclusively State-oriented validity 
of fundamental rights, or else their enforcement throughout society. I suggest instead 
leaving the beaten tracks and going a roundabout way through somwehat obscure 
territories of legal and social theory. The detour is starting with what I call divisional 
concepts of fundamental rights and ending with ecological ones. This will open up a 
different view of fundamental rights in the transnational private sector. It amounts to 
the following question: Can the “horizontal” effect of fundamental rights be rethought, 
from  interpersonal  conflicts  between  individual  bearers  of  fundamental  rights  to 
conflicts between the anonymous matrices of communication on the one hand and 
concrete individuals on the other? Can we understand human rights in private sectors 
in such a way that individuals assert their rights against the structural violence of 
apersonal communicative processes? 
  
II. Divisional concepts of fundamental rights 
What  does  one  gain  and  what  does  one  lose  by  taking  this  detour? What 
happens if we see the fundamental-rights question no longer, as in the tradition, as a 
problem of balancing among rights of actors, but as an “ecological” problem:  as a 
damage  that  an  expansive  social  system  does  to  its  social,  human  and  natural   3 
ecologies? Applied to our question, what do we gain from it for the “horizontal” effect 
of human rights in globalized sectors of society, outside of institutionalized politics? 
 
The European tradition has always aspired, in the search for just institutions, 
to an “appropriate” balance between society as a whole and its parts. It has always 
oscillated between experiences of a divided society and abstract conceptions of the 
appropriateneness of its internal balance. Justice to people by the institutions was 
the  heuristic  formula  by  which  legal  semantics  reacted  to  changes  in  the  social 
structure.  The  concept  responded  anew  in  each  case  to  painful  experience  of 
society’s internal divisions. Can a fair balance among individuals and between them 
and society be found? Or in non-individualist versions, can there be a fair balance 
among parts of society – estates, classes, strata, interest groups, ethnic and cultural 
identities, social spheres, sub-rationalities – and between the parts and society as a 
whole? Or can institutional justice be achieved at all only once society’s divisions 
have been overcome and a new unity of society brought about? 
 
Justice to people by the institutions was seen on this view, which I shall call 
divisional, as a problem of society’s internal division into unequal parts – or more 
dramatically,  of  its  destructive  cleavages,  its  power  and  distribution  struggles,  its 
antagonistic conflicts. How is an equitable unity of society to be guaranteed despite 
its self-destructive fragmentation? The classical answer was: Do not eliminate the 
divisions,  but  equilibrate  them  through  suum  cuique!  Neutralize  the  dangerous 
divisive  tendencies  by  assigning  to  the parts  their  due  place  in  the  overall  order! 
Actual human beings were regarded as components of society and justice was done 
to them, through the familiar formulas of justitia distributiva –  the whole allotting to 
the parts (individuals, groups, sectors) their due share – and justitia commutativa –  
the equitable relation of the parts (individuals, groups, sectors) to each other. 
 
Though the divisional view always predominated, the relation of whole to parts 
and the fair balance between them was perceived differently in the course of history. 
Feudal  society  primarily  regulated  the  relations  of  the  estates  with  each  other.  It 
guaranteed  justice  as  the  naturally-given  hierarchy  between  the  partes  majores, 
which at the same time represented the whole of society, understood as corpus, and 
the partes minores.  Human individuals were always transcended in the estate or in 
the corporation. Subjective rights were not thinkable, still less fundamental rights, as 
strictly unilateral entitlements in the modern sense. Instead, the prevailing conception 
was that of ius, as a complex relation of divisional balance, fair in itself, between 
parts of different kinds, such as between feudal lords and vassals, as relations of 
loyalty and care in hierarchical reciprocity. 
 
The  bourgeois  revolution  rebelled  against  the  injustice  of  distributive 
relationships between the estates. It responded to the problem of divisional injustice 
by calling for the equality of all parts of society. The fundamental rights in particular 
followed  a  new  logic  which  however  remained  divisional:  freedom  of  the  parts  in 
relation  to  the  whole  of  society,  equality  among  them,  and  solidarity  as  mutual 
support.  Liberal  theories  thought  through  the  new  divisionalism  consistently  to  its 
end. Society consists only of individuals. Fairness is guaranteed by self-regulating 
invisible hands which, underpinned by fundamental rights, coordinate the individuals’ 
autonomous spheres: economic markets, political elections, competition of opinions, 
free  play  of  scientific  knowledge.  Interventions  of  compensatory  justice  are 
admissible only for rectifying the self-regulation among the parts.    4 
 
The  proletarian  revolution’s  theory  of  society  again  takes  a  divisional 
approach.  The  totality  of  society  consists  of  the  social  classes  that  spring  from 
economic  structural  contradictions.  Justice  will  only  become  possible  once  the 
classless  society  is  born  out  of  their  antagonistic  conflicts.  In  social-democratic 
Welfare State conceptions, the parts of society, the classes, are transformed into 
socio-economic strata. Here again there is a divisional view, especially of the second-
generation  fundamental  rights.  Social  and  participatory  rights  are  aimed  at 
harmonizing  the  living  conditions  of  different  strata  as  political,  State-guaranteed 
justice. 
 
Ultimately,  the  great  social  theories  also  follow  divisional  patterns.  This  is 
clearest in concepts of a social division of labour that finds the fair balance in organic 
rather than mechanical solidarity. In classical functionalism, the divisional element is 
to  be  found  in  the  fact  that  a  balance  comes  about  through  exchange  relations 
among  different  functional  spheres,  and  ultrastability  is  brought  by  compensatory 
mechanisms  when  there  are  occasional  disruptions,  if  necessary  through  State 
compensation  out  of  the  proceeds  of  growth.  And  in  conflict  theories  insoluble 
permanent conflicts replace the just balance among the parts. In the polytheism of 
modernity among differing spheres of rationality, the hope for a lasting fair balance 
has given way to a resigned acquiescience in a chain of tragic decisions. 
 
Specifically  for  human  rights,  these  divisional  theories  of  society  have  the 
consequence that they are conceived of as subjective rights of the parts against the 
State, which represents the whole of society. The versions of the horizontal effect of 
the fundamental rights in the private sector follow this divisional approach. What is 
involved  is the distribution of society’s unevenly divided resources – power, wealth, 
knowledge – on the pattern of justitia distributiva or commutativa. This means either 
an extension of the State-citizen distributive pattern into society, or else resource 
allocation on the commutative pattern: fundamental rights as subjective rights of the 
parts  of  society  against  each  other.  Then  a  balance  of  the  fundamental-rights 
positions of private actors against each other is drawn.  All in all, though, it remains 
unclear  how  far  and  on  what  terms  fundamental  rights  can  claim  validity  in  non-
political sectors of society. 
 
III. Ecological concepts of fundamental rights 
There is a deeper question, though: Is it at all appropriate to see the justice of 
institutions to people as divisional (distributive) justice between the whole and the 
parts (or, among the parts)? And to regard human rights as guarantees – formal, 
material  or  procedural  –  to  individuals  against  the  societal  whole,  the  State  as 
organizational form of the overall society (or, reciprocal guarantees by the parts)? 
  
Social theory here puts a different question: Is the internal division of society that 
creates injustice as inequality among people not just a secondary phenomenon? It 
understands  society’s  internal  divisions  otherwise,  namely  as  resulting  from  the 
interaction of autonomized communicative networks with their environment. Actual 
people are not at the centre of these networks, nor can they get back inside them.  
People are the environment for the autonomized communicative networks, to whose 
operations they are exposed without being able to control them.  This is seen most 
penetratingly by systems theory, which argues that the autonomy of communicative   5 
networks excludes people radically from society. Systems theory is here reprising 
theorems of social alienation from the tradition of social theory. At this point there are 
secret contacts with officially hostile theories: with Foucault’s analyses of disciplinary 
power, Agamben’s critique of social exclusion, Lyotard’s theory of closed discourses 
and Derrida’s deconstruction of justice, even if these contacts are officially denied on 
all sides. This can only be indicated here, not enlarged on. 
 
The  legal  follow-up  question  is:  If  people  are  not  parts  of  society,  but  for  ever 
banished from it, how are human rights to be reformulated? Whereas the tradition 
saw the question of just institutions as being created by the internal divisions of society, 
and therefore aimed at institutional justice despite differences, today much presumably 
argues  in  favour  of  distinguishing  the  social  system  from  its  natural  and  human 
environment,  and  consequently  describing  institutional  justice  as  difference:  as 
responsiveness  within  the  unbridgeable  difference  between  social  institutions  and 
actual people. Fundamental rights are then not a response to distribution problems 
within society, but an answer to problems that transcend society. Fundamental rights 
demand an ecological sensitivity of communication. And the next follow-up question 
is: Does the far-advanced fragmentation of society not in turn create new internal 
boundaries,  with  other  subsystems  on  one  hand  and  with  environments  outside 
society on the other, so that the fairness of specialized social institutions too can only 
properly be posed as an ecological problem? 
 
Such  an  ecological  perception  of  fundamental  rights  as  “just”    boundary 
relations between social systems and their various environments takes on two new 
dimensions  if  we  compare  it  with  divisional  theories  that  see  people  as  parts  of 
society  and  justice  as  a  problem  of  inequality.  First,  there  is  the  insurmountable 
difference between communication and its environment. Can communication, then, 
ever at all do justice to people? Can communications from specialized institutions 
ever  do  justice  to  their  social  environments?  The  second  dimension  is  that  the 
question is no longer one of distribution of social resources in the broadest sense, i.e. 
power,  wealth,  knowledge,  life  chances,  among  the  parts  of  society.  Instead,  the 
point is to choose the institutions’ acts in such a way that they do justice to their 
social and human environments. The overcoming of inequality among people and the 
fair distribution of resources is then replaced by two quite different demands on social 
institutions: 1. Internal and external limitation of their expansive tendencies; 
2.  Sensitive  balancing  between  their  intrinsic  rationality  and  the demands  of  their  
human, social and natural ecologies. 
 
The human-rights tradition is thereby accused of not taking human individuals 
seriously. This is not despite but because of its basic humanistic approach, which 
leads it – against its better knowledge – to set human beings at the centre of the 
institutions. The category error of the divisional tradition could be formulated using 
Magritte’s  familiar  caption:  ceci  n’est  pas  une  pipe;  or  in  the  fundamental-rights 
context: la personne n’est pas un etre humain. Traditional thought, by understanding 
fundamental rights as areas of personal autonomy, brings about a fatal equation of 
“mind/body”  on  the  one  hand  and  “person”  on  the  other.  But  if  one  takes  the 
difference  seriously  by  seeing  the  “person”  as  a  mere  internal  construct  of  social 
communication  on  the  one  hand,  and  mind/body  as  living,  pulsing  entities  in  the 
communication’s environment on the other, then it becomes clear that the humanistic 
equation  of  semantic  artefacts  with  actual  people  is  precisely  what  does  not  do 
justice to blood-and-flesh people.    6 
 
That people are not parts of society but insuperably separate from it, has one 
inexorable consequence: society and mind/body  are not communicatively accessible 
to  each  other.  Mind  and  body  are  each  independent,  self-sustaining  (mental  or 
organic) processes. Both have certainly brought about communication, but cannot 
control it. Communication becomes autonomous from people, creating its own world 
of meaning over against the individual consciousness. This can be used by people 
productively  for  their  survival,  but  it  can  also  –  and  this  is  the  point  at  which 
fundamental rights become relevant – turn against them and threaten their integrity, 
or even terminate their existence. Extreme examples are: killing through a chain of 
command, sweatshops as a consequence of anonymous market forces, martyrs as a 
result of religious communication, political or military torture as destruction of identity. 
 
It  is  in  these  negative  externalities  of  communication,  in  their  potential  to 
threaten life and consciousness, that the core of the human-rights problematique lies 
–  not,  as  the  tradition  supposed,  in  social  inequality  among  human  beings!  The 
environment-threatening potential of society seen as a communicative ensemble is 
by  no  means  in  contradiction  with  its  operative  closure;  on  the  contrary,  it  is  its 
consequence.  To  be  sure,  their  mutual  closure  makes  society  and  people  totally 
inaccessible  to  each other.  Communicative  processes  cannot penetrate  body  and 
soul; body and soul are external to communication. But communication can irritate 
psycho-physical processes in such a way as to threaten their self-preservation. Or it 
may simply destroy them. This is the place where the body and consciousness of 
individuals (not of “persons”) comes up against their “pre-legal”, “pre-political”, even 
“pre-social” (= extra-societal) “latent intrinsic rights”. They insist on their identity and 
their self-preservation against destructive perturbations of communication – and at 
the same time without having any forum available before which they could assert 
these “rights”. And human rights in the strict sense should be restricted to this “crass” 
matter  of  mental  and  physical  self-preservation  against  communicative  processes 
and  not  burdened  with  quite  different  problems  of  social  communication  –  the 
relevance  of  which  for  fundamental  rights  in  the  broader  sense  is  by  no  means 
thereby denied. 
  
These latent “rights” become overt, however, only if bodily pain and mental 
suffering no longer remain unheard in their speechlessness, but succeed in  irritating 
society’s communication and set off new distinctions there. The ill-treated bodies’ and 
souls’  defences  can  be  “heard”  only  if  themselves  expressed  in  communication. 
Those are the social messages of physical violence as anti-power communication, or 
of suffering souls complaining and protesting. Only then is there a chance for social 
conflicts about the core area of human rights to develop.  But these can only ever be 
proxies,  able  correspondingly  only  to  re-present  people  in  communication,  not 
present them. These communicative conflicts are in no way thematically identical with 
the real conflict that the communication sets going in relation to its ecologies, mind 
and body. Nor do they reflect them acccurately, but are merely resonances within 
society of the external conflicts, mere reconstructions of ecological conflicts within the 
communication. They result in rules internal to communication, which in their turn can 
neither  regulate  nor  protect  mind  and  body.  But  they  can  in  complicated  fashion 
become relevant for both, if social rules ultimately set extra-communicative bounds 
on the communication. Here is where the law’s central figure – the legal prohibition: 
thou  shall  not  –  derives  its  effect  beyond  the  boundaries  of  the  communicative: 
prohibitions of particular communications (ban on killing, ban on torture). Thus “latent   7 
rights” (= intrinsic claims of flesh-and-blood people to bodily and mental integrity) 
become “living rights” in Eugen Ehrlichs sense and “human rights” in the non-techical 
legal  sense,  which  can  be  fought  for  anywhere  in  society  (not  just  in  law  or  in 
politics). (This is not to be confused with the distinction in legal philosophy between 
rights in the state of nature and in the civil state). 
 
That  is  why  it  makes  no  sense  to  see  human  rights  as  a  decision  of  the 
political sovereign – whether the prince or the self-governing people –  in the positive 
law. While they do not represent natural law rights in the sense of some pre-political 
absolute validity, they are pre-social in a quite different sense, as being based on 
“latent rights” of the body and the soul to their integrity, and at the same time they are 
pre-political and pre-legal, as being built on the “living law of human rights” arising out 
of communicative conflicts in politics, morals, religion or law about those rights, and 
the resulting conquests. Positivizing them as technical law in politics and law is not 
some free decision of the democratically legitimated legislator, but is based on this 
twofold foundation of self-sustaining processes outside society and conflicts within it. 
 
IV. Fundamental rights as a problem of modernity: expansion of political power
   
The problem of “latent human rights” thus always arises whenever there is 
communication at all: as “intrinsic rights” of organic life and of mental experience, vis-
à-vis the endangerment of their integrity by social communication. In old Europe this 
was,  however,  “translated”  into  the  semantics  not  of  human  rights,  but  of  the 
perfection of man in imperfect nature, or of the soul’s salvation in the corrupt world. 
The original Fall of Man happens at the Tree of Knowledge: the meaning-producing 
force  of  communication,  with  its  ability  to  distinguish  good  and  evil,  destroys  the 
original  unity  of  man  and  nature,  makes  man  godlike  and  leads  to  the  loss  of 
Paradise. The origin of alienation lies in the very first communication. 
 
Human rights in their specific modern sense appear only with the second Fall. 
It does not, as for Marx, coincide with the emergence of private property, but with the 
autonomization  of  a  multiplicity  of  separate  communicative  worlds.  First,  and 
everywhere visibly since Macchiavelli, the matrix of politics becomes autonomous. It 
becomes  detached  from  the  diffuse  moral-religious-economic  ties  of  the  old 
European  society,  and  extends  to  infinity  the  usurpation  potential  of  its  special 
medium,  power,  without  any  immanent  restraints.  Its  operative  closure  and  its 
structural autonomization let it create new environments for itself, vis-à-vis which it 
develops  expansive,  indeed  downright  imperialist  tendencies.  Absolute  power 
liberates unsuspected destructive forces. Centralized power for legitimate collective 
decisions,  which  develops  a  special  language  of  its  own,  indeed  a  high-flown 
rationality of the political, has an inherent tendency to totalize them beyond limit. Its 
expansion  goes  in  two  directions.  First,  it  crosses  the  boundaries  to  other  social 
sectors. Their response is to insist on their autonomy free of intervention by politics – 
this is the birth of fundamental rights, either as institutional or as personal right to 
autonomy. Fundamental rights demarcate from politics areas of autonomy allotted 
either  to  social  institutions  or  to  persons  as  social  constructs.  In  both  cases 
fundamental  rights  set  bounds  on  the  totalizing  tendencies  of  the  political  matrix 
within society. Second, politics expands with particular verve across the boundaries 
of society, in its endeavours to control the human mind and body. Their defences 
become effective only once they can be communicated as protest in complaints and   8 
in violence, are translated socially into political struggles of the oppressed against 
their  oppressors,  and  finally  end  up,  via  historical  compromises,  in  political 
guarantees  of  the  self-limitation  of  politics  vis-à-vis  people  as  psycho-physical 
entities. These are, by comparison with the previously mentioned institutional and 
personal fundamental rights, human rights in the strict sense. 
 
The fundamental-rights tradition has always translated these “latent” human 
rights into compact individual fundamental rights, through a re-entry of the external 
into  the  internal.  Communication  cannot  guarantee  or  regulate  the  autonomy  of 
consciousness,  nor  even  describe  it  appropriately  with  any  prospect  of  a 
correspondence between percept and object. The difference between communication 
and  consciousness  is  unbridgeable.  But  this  difference  is  repeated  within 
communication via re-entry. The outside human beings (mind and body) which are 
not  accessible  by  communication,  are  modelled  within  the  law  as  “persons”,  as 
“bearers of fundamental rights”, without any guarantee for correspondence between 
persons within society and people outside it. It is to these artefacts of communication 
that actions are attributed and areas of freedom granted as fundamental rights. The 
tradition here makes the pernicious equation of person and human being already 
criticized above, in the unitary concept of individual fundamental rights. It does not 
distinguish between guarantees of communicative freedoms on the one hand and 
guarantees of psycho-physical integrity on the other. Against this, we must insist on 
the difference between personal rights and human rights in the strict sense. Human 
rights in this sense too depend on the technique of re-entry, but are to be understood 
as having a semantic difference from personal communicative freedoms, namely as 
intended guarantees of the integrity of consciousness and body. 
 
V. Fragmentation of society: multiplication of expansive social systems   
This  model  of  fundamental  rights  which  is  oriented  toward  politics  and  the 
State, works only as long as the State can be identified with society, or at least, the 
State  regarded  as  society’s  organizational  form,  and  politics  as  its  hierarchical 
coordination.  However,  insofar  other  highly  specialized  communicative  media 
(money, knowledge, law, medicine, technology) gain autonomy, this model loses its 
plausibility. At this point, horizontal effects of fundamental and human rights become 
relevant.  Fragmentation  of  society  multiplies  the  boundary  zones  between 
autonomized  communicative  matrices  and  human  beings.  The  new  territories  of 
meaning each draw boundaries of their own with their human environments. Here 
new dangers arise for the integrity of body and soul. These are the issues to which 
the “third-party effect” of human rights in the strict sense should be confined. Another, 
no less important, set of issues of constitutional rights would be the autonomy of 
institutional  communicative  spheres  vis-à-vis  “private”  subjugation,  and  a third  the 
autonomy of personal communicative freedoms. 
 
Thus,  human  rights  cannot  be  limited  to  the  relation  between  State  and 
individual,  or  the  area  of  institutionalized  politics,  or  even  only  to  phenomena  of 
power in the broadest sense. Specific endangerment of physical and mental integrity 
by a communicative matrix comes not just from politics, but in principle from all social 
sectors  that  have  expansive  tendencies.  For  the  matrix  of  the  economy,  Marx 
clarified this particularly through such concepts as alienation, fetishism, autonomy of 
capital, commodification of the world, exploitation of man by man. Today we see – 
most clearly in Foucault, Agamben, Legendre – similar threats to integrity from the   9 
matrices of the natural sciences, of psychology, the social sciences, technology and 
medicine, of the press, radio and television (keywords: Dr.  Mengele, reproductive 
medicine, extension of life through intensive care, the lost honour of Katharina Blum). 
 
By now it should have become clear why it makes no sense to talk about the 
“third-party effect” of political fundamental rights. There is no transfer from the State 
guarantees  of  individual  freedoms  into  relations  between  “third  parties”,  between 
private  actors.  Something  else  is  instead  needed  –  to  develop  new  types  of 
guarantee  that  limit  the  destructive  potential  of  communication  outside 
institutionalized politics against body and soul. The State-action approach thus falls 
short by letting fundamental rights operate in the private sector only if trace elements 
of State action can be identified. And the economic-power approach misleads too, by 
seeing fundamental rights only as a response to power phenomena. This is much too 
narrow,  since  while  social  power  is  covered  by  it,  the  subtler  endangerments  to 
integrity from other communicative matrices are not. 
 
Accordingly,  it  is  today  the  fragmentation  of  society  that  is  central  to  the 
human-rights  question.  There  is  not  just  one  single  boundary  political 
communication/human being, guarded by human rights. Instead, the problems arise 
in numerous social institutions, each forming their own boundaries with their human 
environments:  politics,  economy,  law,  science,  medicine  (never  as  a  whole/part 
relation, but understood as difference between communication and consciousness). 
Everything  then  comes  down  to  identifying  the  various  frontier  posts,  so  as  to 
recognize  the  violations  that  endanger  human  integrity  by  their  specific 
characteristics. Where are the frontier posts? – Answer: in the various constructs of 
persons in the subsystems: homo politicus, oeconomicus, juridicus, organizatoricus, 
retalis etc. These are constructs within communication, enabling classification, but at 
the same time real points of contact with people “out there”. It is through the mask of 
the  “person”  that  the  social  systems  make  contact  to  people;  while  they  cannot 
communicate with them, they can massively irritate them and in turn be irritated by 
them.  In  tight  perturbation  cycles,  communication  irritates  consciousness  with  its 
selective  “enquiries”,  conditioned  by  assumptions  about  rational  actors,  and  is 
irritated  by  the  “answers”,  in  turn  highly  selectively  conditioned.  It  is  in  this 
recursiveness  that  the  “exploitation”  of  man  by  the  social  systems  (not  by  man!) 
comes  about.  The  social  system  as  a  specialized  communicative  process 
concentrates  its  irritations  of  human  beings  on  the  person-constructs.  It  “sucks” 
mental and physical energies from them for its own self-preservation. It is only in this 
highly  specific  way  that  Foucault’s  disciplinary  mechanisms  develop  their  specific 
effects. 
VI.  The anonymous matrix 
If  violation  of  fundamental  rights  stem  from  totalizing  tendencies  of  partial 
rationalities,  then  there  is  no  longer  any  point  in  seeing  the  horizontal  effect  of 
fundamental rights as if it rights of private actors have to be weighed up against each 
other. But the root of infringement of fundamental rights be looked at closer. The 
simple  part-whole  view  of  society  has  after-effects  in  the  image  of  “horizontality”, 
unacceptably taking the sting out of the whole human-rights issue, as if the sole point 
were that individuals threaten other individuals.  
 
Violation of the integrity of individuals by other individuals, whether through 
communication, mere perception or direct physical action, is, however, a completely   10 
different set of issues, that arose long before the radical fragmentation of society in 
our days. It must systematically be separated from the fundamental-rights question 
as such. In the European tradition it is (alongside other constructions) translated into 
social terms by attributing to persons, as communicative representatives of actual 
human  beings,  “subjective  rights”  against  each  other.  This  was  philosophically 
expanded  by  the  theory  of  subjective  rights  in  the  Kantian  tradition,  according  to 
which ideally the citizens’ spheres of arbitrary freedom are demarcated from each 
other in such a way that the rights can take a generalizable form. Legally, this idea 
has been most clearly developed in classical law of tort. Now, “fundamental rights” in 
their  institutional,  personal  and  human  dimensions,  as  here  proposed,  differ  from 
“subjective rights” in private law. They are not about mutual endangerment of private 
individuals,  i.e.  intersubjective  relations,  but  about  dangers  to  the  integrity  of 
institutions, persons and individuals which are created by anonymous communicative 
matrices (institutions, discourses, systems).  
 
The Anglo-American tradition speaks in both cases indifferently about “rights”, 
thereby overlooking from the outset the fundamental distinction between subjective 
rights and fundamental rights, while in turn being able to deal with them together. By 
contrast,  criminal  law  concepts  of  macro-criminality  and  criminal  responsibility  of 
formal organizations come close to the issues in mind here. But they are confined to 
the  dangers  stemming  from  “collective  actors”  (States,  political  parties,  business 
firms, groups of companies, associations) and miss the dangers stemming from the 
anonymous  “matrix”,  from  autonomized  communicative  processes  (institutions, 
functional systems, networks) that are not personified as collectives. Even political 
human  rights  should  not  be  seen  as  relations  between  political  actors  (State  vs. 
citizen), i.e. as an expression of person-person relations. Instead, they are relations 
between anonymous power processes on the one hand and tortured bodies and hurt 
souls on the other. This is expressed in communication only very imperfectly, not to 
say misleadingly, as the relation between the State as “person” and the “persons” of 
the individuals. 
  
It would be repeating the infamous category error of the tradition were one to 
treat  the  horizontal  effect  of  fundamental  rights  as  subjective  rights  between 
individual  persons.  That  would  just  end  up  in  law  of  tort,  with  its  intersubjective 
relations. And we would be forced to apply the concrete State-oriented fundamental 
rights  wholesale  to  the  most  varied  intersubjective  relations,  with  disastrous 
consequences for elective freedoms of intersubjectivity. Here lies the rational core of 
the  excessive  protests  of  private  lawyers  against  the  penetration  of  fundamental 
rights into private law –  though they in turn are exaggerated and overlook the real 
issues.  
 
The  category  error  can  be  avoided.  Both  the  “old”  political  and  the  “new” 
polycontextural  human-rights  question  should  be  understood  as  people  being 
threatened not by their fellows, but by anonymous communicative processes. These 
must in the first place be identified. Focault has seen them most clearly, radically 
depersonalizing  the  phenomenon  of  power  and  identifying  today’s  micro-power 
relations  in  society’s  capillaries  as  the  expression  of  discourses/practices  of 
“disciplines” (Foucault’s problem is, to be sure, his quite obsessive fixation on the 
phenomenon  of  power,  which  leads  him  to  inflate  the  concept  of  power 
meaninglessly, and cannot cope with the more subtle effects of other communication 
media).   11 
 
We  can  now  summarize  the  outcome  of  our  abstract  considerations:  the 
human-rights question in the strictest sense must today be seen as endangerment of 
individuals’ body/soul integrity by a multiplicity of anonymous, autonomized and today 
globalized  communicative  processes.  The  fragmentation  of  world  society  into 
autonomous subsystems not only creates new boundaries between subsystem and 
human  being,  but  beyond  that  also  between  the  various  subsystems,  and  the 
expansive tendencies of the subsystems work on these. It now becomes clear how 
the new “equation” replaces the old “equation” of the horizontal effect. The old one 
was based on a relation between two private actors – private perpetrator and private 
victim of the infringement.  On one side of the new equation is no longer a private 
actor  as  the  fundamental-rights  violator,  but  the  anonymous  matrix  of  an 
autonomized  communicative  medium.  On  its  other  side  is  no  longer  simply  the 
compact  individual.  Instead,  protection  of  the  individual,  hitherto  seen  in  unitary 
terms,  splits  up  because  of  the  new  boundaries  into  several  dimensions.  On  this 
other side of the equation, the fundamental rights have to be systematically divided 
into three or even four dimensions: 
 
- institutional  rights protecting the autonomy of social discourses – the autonomy of 
art, of science, of religion - against their subjugation by the totalizing tendencies of 
the communicative matrix  
 
-  personal  rights  protecting  the  autonomy  of  communications,  attributed  not  to 
institutions, but to the social artefacts called “persons”  
 
- human rights as negative bounds on societal communication, where the integrity of 
individuals’  body  and  mind  is  endangered  by  a  communicative  matrix  crossing 
boundaries  
 
(-  additionally,  though  not  systematically  discussed  here:  ecological  rights,  where 
society endangers the integrity of natural processes). 
 
It should be stressed that specific fundamental rights are to be allocated to 
these  dimensions  not  one-to-one,  but  with  a  multiplicity  of  overlaps.  Some 
fundamental rights are mainly to be attributed to one dimension or the other (e.g: 
freedom of art, freedom of science, and property primarily to the institutional, freedom 
of  speech  primarily  to  the  personal  and  freedom  of  conscience  primarily  to  the 
human-rights dimension); some display all three dimensions (e.g. religious freedom). 
It is all the more important, then, to distinguish the three dimensions carefully within 
the various fundamental rights. 
VII. Justiciability?  
Let us now concentrate on the third dimension, human rights in the strictest 
sense, protecting the integrity of mind and body. The ensuing question for lawyers is: 
Can the “horizontal” effect of fundamental rights be reformulated from conflicts within 
society  (person  vs.  person)  to  conflicts  between  society  and  its  ecologies 
(communication vs. body/soul)? In other words, from interpersonal conflicts between 
individual bearers of fundamental rights to ecological conflicts between anonymous 
communicative processes on the one hand and concrete people on the other? 
 
The difficulties are enormous. To list only a few:    12 
 
How  can  destructive  system/environment  relations  “between”  the  universes  
Communication  and  Consciousness  at  all  be  addressed  as  a  conflict,  as  social 
conflict or indeed as legal conflict – a real Lyotard problem: if not as litige, then at 
least as différend? Failing a supreme court for meaning, all that can happen is that 
mental experience endures the infringement and then fades away unheard. Or else it 
gets  “translated”  into communication,  but  then  the paradoxical  and  highly  unlikely 
demand will be for the infringer of the right (society, communication) to punish its own 
crime! Have fun turning poachers into gamekeepers. But bear in mind: politics has 
already, by institutionalizing fundamental rights, managed precisely this gamekeeper-
poacher self-limitation – however imperfectly.  
 
How can the law describe the boundary conflict, when after all it has only the 
language of “rights” of “persons” available? Can it, in this impoverished rights talk, in 
any way construct the difference between interpersonal conflicts and communicative  
endangerments of individuals? Here reach the limits of what is conceivable in legal 
doctrine, and the limits of court proceedings as well. In them, there must always be a 
claimant suing a defendant for infringing his rights. In this framework of mandatory 
binarization, can human rights at all be asserted against the structural violence of 
anonymous communicative processes? The only way this can happen – at any rate 
in litigation – is simply to re-use the category error so harshly criticized above, but 
immanently  correcting  it,  in  an  awareness  of  its  falsehood,  by  a  difference.  That 
means individual suits against private actors, in which human rights, though not rights 
of persons against persons but of flesh-and-blood human beings against structural 
violence of the matrix, are asserted. In traditional terms, the conflict with institutional 
problems that is really meant has to take place within individual forms of action. We 
are  already  familiar  with  something  similar  from  existing  institutional  theories  of 
fundamental  rights,  which  recognize  as  their  bearers  not  only  persons,  but  also 
institutions. But the point here is not rights of impersonal institutions against the State 
but, in a multiple inversion of the relation, rights of individuals outside society against 
social institutions outside the State. 
 
Is this distinction sharp enough to be justiciable? Can person/person-conflicts 
be  separated  from  individual/individual  conflicts,  and  these  in  turn  from 
communication/individual  conflicts,  if  after  all  communication  is  enabled  only  via 
individuals/persons? Translated into the language of society or of law, this becomes 
a problem of attribution. Whodunnit? Under what conditions can the endangerment of 
integrity be attributed not to persons/individuals, but to anonymous communication 
processes? If so, then a genuine human-rights problem would have been formulated 
even in the impoverished rights talk of the law.  
 
In an extreme simplification, the “horizontal” human-rights problematique can 
perhaps be described in familiar legal categories: the problem arises only where the 
endangerment  of  body/soul  integrity  comes  from  social  “institutions”  (and  not  just 
from individual actors). Institutions in principle cover private formal organizations and 
private regulatory systems. The most important cases would here be business firms, 
private  associations,  hospitals,  schools,  universities  as  formal  organizations;  and 
general terms of trade, private standardization and similar rule-settings as private 
regulatory  systems.  We  must  of  course  be  clear  that  the  term  institution  only 
imperfectly  represents  the  chains  of  communicative  acts  endangering  integrity, 
characterized by a special medium, that are really meant – the anonymous “matrix” –   13 
and  barely  makes  its  expansive  dynamic  visible.  But for  lawyers,  oriented  toward 
rules and persons, it has the inestimable advantage of defining the institution as a 
bundle of norms and at the same time letting it be personified. The concept of the 
institution could accordingly respecify fundamental rights in social sectors (as it were, 
the equivalent for the State as institution and as person). The outcome would then be 
a formula of “third-party effect” plausible also to the black-letter lawyer: not horizontal 
effect as a balancing between the fundamental rights of individual bearers of them, 
but  instead  human  rights  and  rights  of  discourses  vis-à-vis  expansive  social 
institutions. 
 
VIII. HIV/AIDS versus MNEs 
 
Let us, with now heightened but at the same time lowered expectations, take 
another look at the HIV catastrophe in South Africa. I cannot offer a solution, but at 
best suggest directions the human rights might develop in. It should be fairly clear 
how inadequate it is to weigh up patients’ individual fundamental right to life against 
the MNEs’ individual property right in court proceedings. The matter is not one of 
corporate social responsibility, with a single corporate actor infringing fundamental 
rights of AIDS patients through pricing policy. A human right of access to medication 
can  become  a  reality  only  if  the  “horizontal”  effect  of  fundamental  rights  is 
reformulated from interpersonal conflicts (person vs. person) to system/environment 
conflicts (communication vs. body/soul, or institution vs. institution). 
 
In the institutional dimension, the conflict needs to be set in its social context, 
which  means  to  note  that  the  AIDS  catastrophe  is  ultimately  due  to  a  clash  of 
incompatible  logics  of  action.  The  critical  conflict  concerning  patent  rights  to 
medicines is the contradiction of norms of economic rationality with norms formed in 
the health context. In this case the point is not, then, to impose price controls on 
pharmaceutical firms, but to develop abstract and general rules on incompatibilities 
between the business sector and the health sector, and prepare WIPO, WTO and UN 
law, as part of a transnational patent law, to respond to destructive conflicts between 
incompatible  logics  of  action  by  building  health  concerns  into  norms  of  economic 
rationality. Since there is no paramount court for the conflict, it can always only be 
solved from the viewpoint of one of the conflicting regimes, here the WTO. But the 
competing logic of action, here the principles of the health system, has to brought into 
the economic-law context as a limitation. 
  
It is, however, to be feared that the genuine human-rights dimension will not 
be  adequately  taken  into  account.  In  other  words,  if  access  to  medication  is  not 
lastingly improved by the measures now decided and the planned WIPO treaties, 
then  the  transnational  development  of  patent  law  in  relation  to  pharmaceutical 
products  will  have  to  be  adjusted  again,  whether  by  granting,  in  transparent, 
procedurally simplified and low-cost fashion, the right to compulsory licensing, or by a 
licence or patent exception system graded according to economic capacity, or finally 
by the radical cure of a general settlement completely removing certain medicines 
from the protection of transnational patent law for a period. 
 
This  sketch  of  legal  ways  to  react  to  the  AIDS  catastrophe  shows  the 
inappropriateness of the optimism that the human-rights problem can be solved using 
the  resources  of  legal  policy.  Even  institutional  rights  confront  the  law  with  the   14 
boundaries between social subsystems. Can one discourse do justice to the other? 
This is a problem the dilemmas of which have been analysed by Lyotard. But it is at 
least a problem within society, one Luhmann sought to respond to with the concept of 
justice  as  socially  adequate  complexity.  The  situation  is  still  more  dramatic  with 
human rights in the strict sense, located at the boundary between communication 
and  the  individual  human  being.  All  the  groping  attempts  to  juridify  human  rights 
cannot hide the fact that this is a strictly impossible project. How can society ever “do 
justice” to real people if people are not its parts but stand outside communication, if 
society  cannot  communicate  with  them  but  at  most  about  them,  indeed  not even 
reach them but merely either irritate or destroy them? In the light of grossly inhuman 
social practices the justice of human rights is a burning issue, but one which has no 
prospect of resolution. This has to be said in all rigour. 
 
If  a  positive  concept  of  justice  in  the  relation  between  communication  and 
human being is definitively impossible, then what is left, if we are not to succumb to 
post-structuralist quietism, is only second best. In the law, we have to accept that the 
problem  of  body/soul-integrity  can  be  experienced  only  through  the  inadequate 
sensors  of  irritation,  reconstruction  and  re-entry.  The  deep  dimension  of  conflicts 
between communication, consciousness and body at best be guessed at by law. And 
the  only  signpost  left  is  the  legal  prohibition,  through  which  a  self-limitation  of 
communication  seems  possible.  But  even  this  prohibition  can  describe  the 
transcendence of the other only allegorically. This programme of justice is ultimately 
doomed to fail, and cannot, with Derrida, console itself that it is “to come, à venir”, but 
has to face up to being in principle impossible. The justice of human rights can, then, 
at  best  be  formulated  negatively.  It  is  aimed  at  removing  unjust  situations,  not 
creating just ones. It is only the counter-principle to communicative violations of body 
and  soul,  a  protest  against  inhumanities  of  communication,  without  it  ever  being 
possible to say positively what the conditions of “humanly just” communication might 
be. 
  
Nor  do  the  emancipatory  programmes  of  modernity  help  any  further.  No 
information  comes  from  criteria  of  democratic  involvement  of  individuals  in  social 
processes, since only persons take part, not bodies nor minds. From this viewpoint 
one  can  only  be  amazed  at  the  naïvety  of  participatory  romanticism.  Democratic 
procedures are no test of a society’s human rights justice. Equally uninformative are 
the universalization theories that proceed transcendentally via a priori characteristics 
or via a posteriori universalization of expressed needs. What do such philosophical 
abstractions  have  to  do  with  actual  human  individuals?  The  same  applies  to 
economic theories of individual preferences aggregated through market mechanisms. 
 
Only the self-observation of soul/body – introspection, suffering, pain – can 
judge  whether  communication  infringes  human  rights.  If  these  self-observations, 
however  distorted,  gain  entry  to  communication,  then  there  is  some  chance  of 
humanly just self-limitation of communication. The decisive thing is the “moment”: the 
simultaneity  of  consciousness  and  communication;  the  cry  that  expresses  pain. 
Hence the closeness of justice to spontaneous indignation, unrest, protest, and its 
remoteness from philosophical, political and legal discourses. 
 